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THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION AND CARBON MONOXIDE 
CHAD G. MARZEN* 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Approximately 400 individuals die each year and an additional 4000 in-
dividuals are hospitalized annually in the United States due to unintentional 
carbon monoxide exposure.  For the past several decades, insurance policies 
have generally included a pollution exclusion. This Article is intended to con-
tribute to the literature by examining pollution exclusion cases that involved 
carbon monoxide exposure. 
 A majority of courts uphold the validity of the pollution exclusion in 
insurance policies to bar coverage for personal injuries resulting from carbon 
monoxide exposure.  The first part of this Article discusses the majority rule 
and the various arguments courts have utilized to uphold the exclusion. A 
minority rule has also emerged that the pollution exclusion does not apply to 
cases involving carbon monoxide.  The second part of this Article examines 
the arguments courts have utilized in ruling that carbon monoxide is not a 
“pollutant.” 
 In the wake of conflicting guidance from the courts on the applicability 
of the pollution exclusion in cases of carbon monoxide exposure, the final 
part of this Article proposes that as a matter of public policy states amend 
their respective insurance codes to require that insurance policies specifically 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Carbon monoxide, or “CO,” is a colorless and odorless gas.1  Carbon 
monoxide can be found anytime fuel is burned in items such as “cars or 
trucks, small engines, stoves, lanterns, grills, fireplaces, gas ranges, or fur-
naces.”2  Even at low levels of concentration, carbon monoxide can cause 
fatigue in a healthy individual.3  At moderate to higher levels of concentra-
tion, it can cause more severe symptoms including dizziness, nausea, head-
aches and can even be fatal.4  In the United States, it has been reported that 
approximately 400 individuals die each year and an additional 4000 individ-
uals are hospitalized annually due to unintentional carbon monoxide poison-
ing.5  Unfortunately, there are many news articles with reports of carbon 
monoxide poisoning.6  Public safety officials generally encourage individuals 
to check the functionality of carbon monoxide detectors in their homes when 
daylight savings time begins as well as ends.7 
Some of the cases in which personal injuries with carbon monoxide poi-
soning are incurred involve occupants of a home or apartment suffering inju-
ries from carbon monoxide caused by a faulty heater, furnace, oven, or boiler.  
Others involve injuries suffered in a restaurant or even while on a boat.  In a 
number of those cases, the occupant of the home files a personal injury claim 
with their homeowner’s insurer or the tenant files a claim against the landlord 
or the patron of the restaurant files a claim against the restaurant.  In many 
cases, the insurance company will deny its insured coverage under a com-
mercial general liability policy for the personal injury claim due to a “total 
 
1. See Carbon Monoxide’s Impact on Indoor Air Quality, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY 
(2017), https://www.epa.gov/indoor-air-quality-iaq/carbon-monoxides-impact-indoor-air-quality. 
2. Frequently Asked Questions – What is Carbon Monoxide?, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/co/faqs html.   
3. See Carbon Monoxide’s Impact on Indoor Air Quality, supra note 1. 
4. See id. 
5. Frequently Asked Questions – What is Carbon Monoxide?, supra note 2. 
6. See, e.g., Mike LaBella & Kiera Blessing, Methuen family suffers carbon monoxide poison-
ing from generator, EAGLE-TRIBUNE (Nov. 2, 2017), http://www.eagletribune.com/news/merri-
mack_valley/methuen-family-suffers-carbon-monoxide-poisoning-from-generator/arti-
cle_fe0a8b67-0a5c-581e-a9b0-197496ebdaf0 html; Shiina LoSciuto & Shaun Towne, Students 
tested for carbon monoxide exposure at Cranston High School East, WPRI.COM EYEWITNESS NEWS 
(Nov. 2, 2017), http://wpri.com/2017/11/02/emergency-crews-respond-to-cranston-high-school-
east/.  
7. See, e.g., Ken Krall, “Fall Back” A Good Time to Update Home Safety Devices, WXPR 91.7 
FM (Nov. 2, 2017), http://wxpr.org/post/fall-back-good-time-update-home-safety-devices.  
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pollution exclusion” in the insurance policy.8  If there is no insurance cover-
age, then the insured incurs the cost of the judgment.  In some cases where 
the victims of the carbon monoxide poisoning obtain a judgment, it may be 
difficult for the victims to collect the judgment due to a lack of assets of the 
judgment debtor or even bankruptcy.  Essentially, without the insurance cov-
erage for carbon monoxide poisoning, some victims of carbon monoxide poi-
soning may be left uncompensated for their injuries. 
The typical pollution exclusion in an insurance policy excludes coverage 
for personal injuries that “would not have occurred in whole or in part but for 
the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, re-
lease or escape of pollutants at any time.”9  “Pollutants” generally are defined 
in insurance policies as “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or con-
taminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and 
waste.”10 
Over the past several decades, hundreds of courts have ruled upon the 
applicability of the pollution exclusion in a variety of factual scenarios.11  
There are many varied rulings on what constitutes a “pollutant,” including 
 
8. Rory Jurman & Steven Cula, Will the ‘Pollution Exclusion’ Ever Die? Part I, LAW360 (Nov. 
18, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/864250/will-the-pollution-exclusion-ever-die-part-1.  
9. Mark Bell, The Elusive “Pollution” Definition in the CGL Policy, IRMI (Mar. 2013), 
https://www.irmi.com/articles/expert-commentary/pollution-definition-in-the-cgl-policy/.  
10. Am. States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ill. 1997). 
11. See Randy Maniloff, Could This Be The Most Significant And Pro-Policyholder Pollution 
Exclusion Case Ever?, COVERAGE OPINIONS (May 1, 2017), http://www.coverageopin-
ions.info/Vol6IssueSpecial/PolutionExclusion html.  
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conflicting rulings on things such as asbestos,12 Chinese drywall,13 gaso-
line,14 lead,15 manure,16 and silica.17  There is also a divide among courts on 
 
12. Compare e.g., Longhorn Gasket and Supply Co. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 698 Fed. App’x 774, 
781 (5th Cir. 2017) (“The pollution exclusion in U.S. Fire’s excess policies is broad, and applies 
generally to ‘irritants, contaminants, and pollutants.’ Though the case law is mixed, we conclude, 
under the plain language of the policy exclusion, that asbestos constitutes a pollutant and an irri-
tant.”), with Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 609 N.E.2d 506, 512 (N.Y. 1993) stating:  
Asbestos could certainly be an irritant, contaminant or pollutant of the type encom-
passed by the clause . . . We conclude, however, that the clause is ambiguous with regard 
to whether the asbestos fibers at issue – fibers inhaled by persons working closely with 
or suffering long-term exposure to asbestos products – were discharged into the ‘atmos-
phere’ as contemplated by the exclusion. 
13. Compare e.g., Granite State Ins. Co. v. Am. Bldg. Materials, Inc., 504 Fed. App’x 815, 
817-18 (11th Cir. 2013) stating:  
The plain language of the pollution exclusions at issue in this appeal includes the dam-
age from Chinese drywall. The sulfide gas released by the Chinese drywall falls within 
the definition of ‘pollutant’ because it is a ‘gaseous . . . irritant or contaminant.’ And the 
bodily injury and property damage alleged ‘would not have occurred in whole or in part 
but for the actual, alleged, or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release 
or escape’ of this pollutant. 
with Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Am. Bldg. Materials, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1270 (M.D. Fla. 
2011) (“Auto-Owners has not shown that the allegations contained in the underlying lawsuit unam-
biguously fall within the pollution exclusion.”). 
14. Compare e.g., Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Abston Petroleum, Inc., 967 So. 2d 705 (Ala. 
2007) (holding gasoline is a pollutant), with Hocker Oil Co., Inc., v. Barker – Phillips – Jackson, 
Inc., 997 S.W.2d 510 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (holding gasoline is not a pollutant). 
15. Compare e.g., Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Hanson, 588 N.W.2d 777, 779 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1999) stating:  
Applying an ordinary meaning approach to the pollution exclusion also coincides with 
Minnesota’s general rule for insurance policy interpretation . . . This contradicts a line 
of cases in other states that find either (1) the exclusion unambiguously does not exclude 
lead paint in a home, or (2) the language is ambiguous and therefore the exclusion does 
not apply. 
with Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. McFadden, 595 N.E.2d 762, 764 (Mass. 1992) stating: 
We conclude that an insured could reasonably have understood the provision at issue to 
exclude coverage for injury caused by certain forms of industrial pollution, but not cov-
erage for injury allegedly caused by the presence of leaded materials in a private resi-
dence . . . There simply is no language in the exclusion provision from which to infer 
that the provision was drafted with a view toward limiting liability for lead paint-related 
injury. The definition of ‘pollutant’ in the policy does not indicate that leaded materials 
fall within its scope. Rather, the terms used in the pollution exclusion, such as ‘dis-
charge,’ ‘dispersal,’ ‘release,’ and ‘escape,’ are terms of art in environmental law which 
generally are used with reference to damage or injury caused by improper disposal or 
containment of hazardous waste. 
16. Compare Wilson Mut. Ins. Co. v. Falk, 857 N.W.2d 156, 171 (Wis. 2014) stating:  
A reasonable insured may not consider manure safely applied to a field to be a pollutant; 
however, a reasonable insured would consider manure in a well to be a pollutant. Ma-
nure is a contaminant as it makes water impure or unclean when it comes into contact 
with or mixes with water. The injured parties and the DNR allege that the wells were 
contaminated and polluted by manure, bacteria, and nitrates, requiring the drilling of 
new wells, as the wells were unusable and the water undrinkable . . . Further, as fecal 
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the enforceability of the pollution exclusion in cases involving carbon mon-
oxide exposure. 
Many commentators have examined legal issues relating generally to 
pollution exclusions in insurance policies.18  This Article is intended to con-
tribute to the literature by examining pollution exclusion cases that involve 
 
matter, manure fits within the ordinary definition of ‘waste,’ and waste is a type of pol-
lutant under the Wilson Mutual policy’s General Farm liability Coverage . . . Therefore, 
a reasonable insured would consider manure to be a largely undesirable and not univer-
sally present substance in a well, and would also consider cow manure to be a pollutant; 
thus, manure is unambiguously a pollutant under these circumstances.  
with Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hilltop View, LLC, 998 N.E.2d 950, 958 (Ill. Ct. App. 2013) (“The 
fact a material is hazardous in certain situations does not always justify to label it constitutes a 
‘hazardous material.’ Manure is one such material.”). 
17. Compare Garamendi v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co., 127 Cal. App. 4th 480 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) 
(holding silica is not a pollutant), with Hanover Ins. Co. v. Superior Labor Servs., Inc., 179 F. Supp. 
3d 656 (E.D. La. 2016) (holding pollution exclusion did not exclude coverage for alleged injuries 
due to silica dust exposure). 
18. See John V. Garaffa & Michael W. Goodin, The Absolute Pollution Exclusion: Pollution 
and Fungus, Wet Rot, Dry Rot, and Bacteria, 50 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 105 (2014); Chris-
topher Meeks, Note, The Pollution Delusion: A Proposal for a Uniform Interpretation of Pollution 
in General Liability Absolute Pollution Exclusions, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824 (2009); Adam M. 
Cole, John C. Ulin, Daniel A. Zariski, & Lisa M. Ciranda, Insurance Coverage for Global Warming 
Liability, 42 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 969 (2007); Carol J. Miller & Nancy J. White, Contrac-
tors and Developers Seek Pollution Insurance Alternatives to Bridge Gap Left Off by CGL Policies, 
33 REAL EST. L.J. 401 (2005); Kurt C. Schultheis, Sullins v. Allstate: Lead Paint and the Growing 
Ambiguity of the Pollution Exclusion Clause, 27 U. BALT. L. REV. 475 (1998); William P. Shelley 
& Richard C. Mason, Application of the Absolute Pollution Exclusion to Toxic Tort Claims: Will 
Courts Choose Policy Construction or Deconstruction?, 33 TORT TRIAL & INS. L.J. 749 (1998); 
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason and Pollution: Correctly Construing the “Absolute” Exclusion in Con-
text and in Accord with its Purpose and Party Expectations, 34 TORT TRIAL & INS. L.J. 1 (1998); 
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unreason in Action: A Case Study of the Wrong Approach to Construing the 
Liability Insurance Pollution Exclusion, 50 FLA. L. REV. 463 (1998); Thomas K. Bick & Lisa G. 
Youngblood, The Pollution Exclusion Saga Continues: Does it Apply to Indoor Releases?, 5 S.C. 
ENVTL. L.J. 119 (1997); Amy Timmer, Are They Lying Now or Were They Lying Then? The Insur-
ance Industry’s Ambiguous Pollution Exclusion: Why the Insurer, and Not the Insured, Should Pay 
for Pollution Caused by Prior Landowners, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 355 (1994); Jacquelyn A. Beatty, 
Exclusions Exclude: Let the Pollution Mean What it Says, 28 GONZ. L. REV. 401 (1993); Edward 
Zampino, Richard C. Cavo, & Victor C. Harwood III, Morton International: The Fiction of Regu-
latory Estoppel, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 847 (1993); Sharon M. Gordon, Note, The “Sudden and 
Accidental” Exception to the Pollution Exclusion Clause in Comprehensive General Liability Pol-
itics: The Gordian Knot of Environmental Liability, 45 VAND. L. REV. 161 (1992); Scott D. Marrs, 
Pollution Exclusion Clauses: Validity and Applicability, 26 TORT TRIAL & INS. L.J. 662 (1991); 
Thomas C. Mielenhausen, Insurance Coverage for Environmental and Toxic Tort Claims, 17 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 945 (1991); Carl A. Salisbury, Pollution Liability Insurance Coverage, the 
Standard-Form Pollution Exclusion, and the Insurance Industry: A Case Study in Collective Amer-
ica, 21 ENVTL. L. 357 (1991); R. Steven Burke, Pollution Exclusion Clauses: The Agony, the Ec-
stasy, and the Irony for Insurance Companies, 17 N. KY. L. REV. 443 (1990); S. Hollis M. Green-
haw, The CGL Policy and the Pollution Exclusion Clause: Using the Drafting History to Raise the 
Interpretation Out of the Quagmire, 23 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 233 (1990); Scott C. Stirling, 
Reasonable Expectations of Insurance Coverage and the Problem of Environmental Liabilities, 22 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 395 (1990). 
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carbon monoxide exposure.  In reviewing the cases involving the pollution 
exclusion and carbon monoxide, it has appeared that a majority of courts up-
hold the validity of the pollution exclusion in insurance policies to bar cov-
erage for personal injuries resulting from carbon monoxide.  Part I of the 
Article discusses the majority rule and the various arguments courts have uti-
lized to uphold the exclusion.  A minority rule has also emerged that the pol-
lution exclusion does not apply to cases involving carbon monoxide.  Part II 
of this Article examines the arguments courts have utilized in ruling that car-
bon monoxide is not a “pollutant.”  Finally, in the wake of conflicting guid-
ance from the courts on the applicability of the pollution exclusion in cases 
of carbon monoxide exposure, Part III of the Article proposes that as a matter 
of public policy states should amend their respective insurance codes to re-
quire that insurance policies specifically provide coverage for personal inju-
ries involving carbon monoxide exposure. 
II. THE MAJORITY RULE – THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION 
APPLIES TO CARBON MONOXIDE  
In examining court decisions involving the pollution exclusion in liabil-
ity insurance policies and carbon monoxide specifically, a majority of court 
decisions have upheld the validity of the pollution exclusion in carbon mon-
oxide cases.  Generally, most courts which uphold the exclusion in cases in-
volving carbon monoxide poisoning conclude that carbon monoxide unam-
biguously falls within the definition of “irritant,” “contaminant,” “fumes,” or 
“chemicals.”  In addition, courts have also tended to focus on the observation 
that many state and federal environmental laws define carbon monoxide as a 
“pollutant.” 
A. THE BERNHARDT CASE – THE GENERAL APPROACH OF COURTS 
UPHOLDING THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION 
Most courts that have upheld the application of the pollution exclusion 
to carbon monoxide cases have taken a similar approach to the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland in Bernhardt v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.19  In the Bern-
hardt case, several tenants of a home suffered injuries in the home due to 
carbon monoxide which emanated from an allegedly defective and improp-
erly maintained central heating system in the home.20  The landlord filed a 
 
19. See Bernhardt v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 1047, 1051-52 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1994). 
20. Id. at 1047. 
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declaratory judgment action against its insurer seeking a determination that 
it was entitled to defense and indemnification from the insurer.21  The insurer 
contended the pollution exclusion clause precluded coverage for the under-
lying lawsuit.22 
The Bernhardt Court concluded that carbon monoxide fell within the 
definitions of “irritant,” “contaminant,” “fumes” and “chemicals.”23  Thus, 
carbon monoxide fell “within the clear language of the definition of ‘pollu-
tant.’”24  Furthermore, the Bernhardt Court also noted the language of the 
contract was “quite specific” and that it was “unable to say a person of ordi-
nary intelligence reading the language of this absolute pollution exclusion 
would conclude that it did not apply to the facts of this case.”25  Despite ac-
knowledging that the insurance industry supported the inclusion of a pollu-
tion exclusion “so broad in its application that it sweeps away coverage well 
beyond that which might be required to meet the industry’s legitimate aims,” 
the Bernhardt Court emphasized it did so “in contract language that is clear 
and unambiguous.”26 
B. OTHER COURTS WHICH HAVE UPHELD THE POLLUTION 
EXCLUSION 
Courts which have upheld the exclusion also have examined the plain 
and ordinary meaning of the contractual terms.  The plain meaning rule has 
been described by one court that “[i]n interpreting contracts, ‘the ordinary 
and usual meaning of the words used is given effect.’”27  In Colony Insurance 
Co. v. Victory Construction LLC, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Oregon examined the dictionary definitions of “irritant,” “contami-
nant,” and “carbon monoxide.”28  After reviewing the definitions of each, the 
Victory Construction Court held that under the plain meaning rule, “carbon 
monoxide is either an ‘irritant’ or ‘contaminant’ and, thus, is a ‘pollutant’ 
under the Policy.”29 
 
21. Id. at 1048. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 1051. 
24. Id. 
25. Bernhardt, 648 A.2d at 1051. 
26. Id. at 1052. 
27. Warburton v. Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 899 P.2d 779, 782 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). 
28. See Colony Ins. Co. v. Victory Constr. LLC, 239 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1285-86 (D. Or. 2017). 
29. Id. at 1286. 
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In addition to the plain meaning rule, courts have examined federal and 
state environmental laws in finding carbon monoxide is a pollutant.  For in-
stance, the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Midwest Family Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Wolters focused on the definitions in both the Clean Air Act and 
the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency.30  The Wolters Court noted that not 
only does the Clean Air Act regulate carbon monoxide as a pollutant, but that 
the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency classifies carbon monoxide as a 
“criteria pollutant.”31  The Court in Wolters also remarked:  “[w]hile there 
may be substances that are difficult to establish as ‘pollutants’ for purposes 
of the absolute pollution exclusion, carbon monoxide is not one of them.”32  
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Matcon Diamond, Inc. v. Penn 
National Insurance Co. referred to the definition of “pollutant or contami-
nant” in CERCLA in its analysis.33  The CERCLA statute has the following 
definition of a “pollutant or contaminant”: 
 
The term ‘pollutant or contaminant’ shall include, but not be limited 
to, any element, substance, compound, or mixture, including dis-
ease-causing agents, which after release into the environment and 
upon exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or assimilation into any organ-
ism, either directly from the environment or indirectly by ingestion 
through food chains, will or may reasonably be anticipated to cause 
death, disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic mutation, 
physiological malfunctions (including malfunctions in reproduc-
tion) or physical deformations, in such organisms or their offspring 
. . . .34 
 
In upholding the application of the pollution exclusion to a case involving 
carbon monoxide injuries, the Court in Matcon Diamond observed that 
“[c]arbon monoxide is a substance or compound which, upon inhalation, may 
reasonably be anticipated to cause death or physiological malfunctions.”35  
Some courts also have declined to review extrinsic evidence on the basis 
that the pollution exclusion is not ambiguous.  In Bituminous Casualty Corp. 
v. Sand Livestock Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court of Iowa held the pollution 
 
30. See Midwest Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d 628, 637 (Minn. 2013). 
31. Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 50.8 (2017); MINN. R. 7005.0100, subp. 8(a) (2011)).  
32. Id. 
33. Matcon Diamond, Inc. v. Penn Nat. Ins. Co., 815 A.2d 1113 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2003). 
34. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(33) (2017). 
35. Matcon Diamond, 815 A.2d at 1113. 
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exclusion encompassed a situation where an individual died due to carbon 
monoxide poisoning in a hog confinement facility.36  The Iowa Supreme 
Court held the pollution exclusion unambiguous and remarked “the plain lan-
guage in the exclusions encompasses the injury at issue here because carbon 
monoxide is a gaseous irritant or contaminant, which was released from the 
propane power washer.”37  Therefore, since no ambiguity existed, the Iowa 
Supreme Court found that it would be inappropriate to refer to extrinsic evi-
dence in order to create an ambiguity.38 
Numerous other courts have upheld the pollution exclusion in cases in-
volving carbon monoxide injuries, including the Supreme Court of Georgia,39 
Court of Appeals of Ohio,40 Superior Court of New Jersey,41 Superior Court 
of Connecticut,42 United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,43 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,44 United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,45 United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit,46 United States District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts,47 United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio,48 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia,49 and the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.50 
 
 
36. Bituminous Cas. Co. v. Sand Livestock Sys., Inc., 728 N.W.2d 216, 222 (Iowa 2007). 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. See Reed v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 667 S.E.2d 90 (Ga. 2008). 
40. See Owners Ins. Co. v. Singh, No. 98-CA-108, 1999 WL 976249 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept 21, 
1999). 
41. See Leo Haus, Inc. v. Selective Ins., 801 A.2d 419 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). 
42. See Wayland v. Atl. Mut. Cas. Co., No. X03CV116026748S, 2015 WL 5236636 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. July 29, 2015). 
43. See Assicurazioni Generali v. Neil, 160 F.3d 997 (4th Cir. 1998). 
44. See Admiral Ins. Co. v. Feit Mgmt. Co., 321 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2003). The Eleventh 
Circuit also upheld the pollution exclusion in a carbon monoxide case in Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. 
Pursley, 487 Fed. App’x. 508 (11th Cir. 2012). 
45. See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Advance Terrazzo & Tile Co., 462 F.3d 1002 (8th Cir. 2006). The 
Eighth Circuit also upheld the pollution exclusion in a carbon monoxide case in Church Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Clay Ctr. Christian Church, 746 F.3d 375 (8th Cir. 2014). 
46. See Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Country Oaks Apartments, Ltd., 566 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 2009). 
47. See Essex Ins. Co. v. Tri-Town Corp., 863 F. Supp. 38 (D. Mass. 1994). 
48. See Longaberger Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 31 F. Supp. 2d 595 (S.D. Ohio 1998). 
49. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nat’l REO Mgmt., Inc., 205 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2000). 
50. See Maxum Indem. Co. v. Fla. Constr. Services, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 3d 1382 (M.D. Fla. 
2014). The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida also upheld the pollution 
exclusion in a carbon monoxide case in Shaw v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 6:15-cv-686-Orl-
TBS, 2016 WL 561409 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2016). 
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III. THE MINORITY RULE – THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION DOES 
NOT APPLY TO CARBON MONOXIDE 
While it appears that a majority of courts uphold the validity of the pol-
lution exclusion in carbon monoxide cases, a strong minority of cases have 
found the exclusion unenforceable in cases involving carbon monoxide ex-
posure.  An often-cited case for the strong minority of cases is the 1997 Su-
preme Court of Illinois case of American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms.51  
The underlying facts of the Koloms case involved injuries suffered by several 
employees of a company housed in a two-story commercial building.52  A 
furnace in the two-story commercial building emitted carbon monoxide 
fumes.53  The employees filed suit against the beneficial owners of the prop-
erty, alleging the owners failed to keep the furnace in proper working condi-
tion and that the owners also failed to inspect repair work which had been 
completed on the furnace.54  The insurer filed a declaratory judgment action 
seeking to obtain a determination it had no duty to defend or indemnify the 
beneficial property owners on the claims on the basis that the pollution ex-
clusion excluded coverage for the injuries caused by carbon monoxide.55  On 
appeal, the insurer generally argued the language in the exclusion was unam-
biguous and should thus be given its plain and ordinary meaning to exclude 
coverage.56  The insureds argued that irrespective of the language of the ex-
clusion it did not apply to fairly common hazards such as defective heating 
and ventilation systems and that the purpose of the exclusion limited it to 
cases involving large scale environmental pollution.57 
In holding the pollution exclusion did not apply to bar coverage for the 
accidental release of carbon monoxide from a defective furnace,58 the Koloms 
Court expressed a sense of concern that a reading of the clause which in-
cluded the facts involving the accidental release of carbon monoxide from a 
furnace would bar insurance coverage in cases that have little or nothing to 
do with what is ordinarily understood as “pollution.”59  The Koloms Court 
 




55. Id.  
56. Id. at 75. 
57. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d at 77. 
58. Id. at 82. 
59. Id. at 79. (“Like many courts, we are troubled by what we perceive to be an overbreadth in 
the language of the exclusion as well as the manifestation of an ambiguity which results when the 
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also examined the history of the pollution exclusion and noted that the im-
plementation of the Clean Air Act in 1970 placed “greater economic burdens 
on insurance underwriters.”60  The Koloms Court recognized the essential 
purpose of the pollution exclusion is to exclude environmental clean-up costs 
from insurance coverage and to avoid costs arising from an “explosion” of 
environmental litigation.61  The Koloms Court cited with approval62 the ob-
servation of the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Waste Management of 
Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Insurance Co. that a primary purpose of the pol-
lution exclusion is to avoid “the yawning extent of potential liability from the 
gradual or repeated discharge of hazardous substances into the environ-
ment.”63  The Koloms Court thus limited the application of the pollution ex-
clusion to cases involving “traditional environmental pollution.”64 
Courts that have found the pollution exclusion inapplicable to cases in-
volving carbon monoxide have generally enunciated the following rationales: 
First, the drafting history and actual text of the pollution exclusion supports 
its application only to cases involving environmental and industrial pollution; 
Second, a reasonable policyholder would not expect injuries due to carbon 
monoxide to be excluded by the pollution exclusion; Third, the lack of a lim-
iting principle on the pollution exclusion would lead to absurd results; Fourth, 
examining the insurance contract as a whole does not support the application 
of the pollution exclusion; and; Fifth, ambiguities with the pollution exclu-
sion support a reading of it in favor of coverage. 
 Each of these rationales, which are distinct and comprise arguments 
of a strong minority rule, will be discussed further below. 
A. THE DRAFTING HISTORY AND ACTUAL TEXT OF THE POLLUTION 
EXCLUSION SUPPORT ITS APPLICATION ONLY TO CASES 
INVOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL AND INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION 
One of the most salient reasons courts cite to preclude the application of 
the pollution exclusion to cases involving carbon monoxide exposure is that 
 
exclusion is applied to cases which have nothing to do with “pollution” in the conventional, or 
ordinary, sense of the word.”). 
60. Id. at 80. (“The passage of these amendments, which included provisions for cleaning up 
the environment, imposed greater economic burdens on insurance underwriters, particularly those 
drafting standard-form CGL policies.”). 
61. Id. at 81. 
62. Id.  
63. See Waste Mgmt. of the Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374, 381 (N.C. 
1986). 
64. See Koloms, 687 N.E.2d at 82.  
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the drafting history of the exclusion does not support its application to areas 
outside of the realm of traditional environmental and industrial pollution.  
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. RSJ, 
Inc. cited65 the Supreme Court of New Jersey opinion in Morton Interna-
tional, Inc. v. General Accident Insurance Co. of America, which detailed a 
history of the exclusion.66  The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Morton In-
ternational, Inc. summarized the history of the exclusion as follows:  
 
Foreseeing an impending increase in claims for environmentally-
related losses, and cognizant of the broadened coverage for pollu-
tion damage provided by the occurrence-based, CGL policy, the in-
surance industry drafting organizations began in 1970 the process 
of drafting and securing regulatory approval for the standard pollu-
tion-exclusion clause . . . Commentators attribute the insurance in-
dustry’s increased concern about pollution claims to environmental 
catastrophes that occurred during the 1960s . . . Other commentators 
observe that the insurance industry, concerned about public reaction 
to environmental pollution, desired to clarify and publicize its posi-
tion that CGL policies did not indemnify knowing polluters.67 
 
Another reason articulated for the presence of the pollution exclusion 
was to prevent insurers from bearing the potentially vast financial costs of 
environmental litigation.68  As the Supreme Court of Nevada stated in Cen-
tury Surety Co. v. Casino West, Inc., “the theory underlying such exclusions 
appears to be that, if an insured knows that his or her policy covers any type 
of pollution, he or she may take fewer precautions to ensure that such envi-
ronmental contaminations do not occur.”69  
In addition to the drafting history of the pollution exclusion, courts have 
also specifically analyzed the terms utilized in the exclusion itself.  For in-
stance, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in the RSJ case specifically noted 
that terms such as “discharge,” “dispersal,” “seepage,” “migration,” “re-
lease,” and “escape” are “environmental law terms of art.”70  As one example, 
 
65. See Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. RSJ, Inc., 926 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996). 
66. See Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 849-50 (N.J. 1993). 
67. Id. 
68. See Century Sur. Co. v. Casino W., Inc., 329 P.3d 614, 617-18 (Nev. 2014). 
69. Id. at 618. 
70. See Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 926 S.W.2d at 681. 
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“release” is defined in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”)71 as “any spilling, leaking, 
pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, 
leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the aban-
donment or discarding or barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles 
containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant.”).72  In ad-
dition, the definition of “pollutant” references words such as “smoke,” “va-
por,” “soot,” “fumes,” “acids,” alkalis,” “chemicals,” and “waste,” terms the 
Supreme Court of Massachusetts noted in Western Alliance Insurance Co. v. 
Gill  “brings to mind products or byproducts of industrial production that may 
 
71. There is a vast academic literature on the legal issues relating to CERCLA. Some law 
review articles discussing CERCLA include: Christopher D. Thomas, Tomorrow’s News Today: 
The Future of Superfund Litigation, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 537 (2014); Margaret J. Pollans, A “Blunt 
Withdrawal”? Bars on Citizen Suits for Toxic Site Cleanup, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 441 (2013); 
Ronald G. Aronovksy, A Preemption Paradox: Preserving the Role of State Law in Private Cleanup 
Cost Disputes, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 225 (2008); Ronald G. Aronovsky, Federalism and CERCLA: 
Rethinking the Role of Federal Law in Private Cleanup Cost Disputes, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (2006); 
Amy Luria, The Suitability of CERCLA Liability for Municipal Pollution of Rivers, 30 SETON HALL 
LEGIS. J. 57 (2005); Fenton D. Strickland, Note, Brownfields Remediated? How the Bona Fide Pro-
spective Purchaser Exemption from CERCLA Liability and the Windfall Lien Inhibit Brownfield 
Redevelopment, 38 IND. L. REV. 789 (2005); Gregg W. Kettles, Bad Policy: CERCLA’s Amended 
Liability for New Purchasers, 21 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1 (2002-2003); John Copeland Nagle, 
CERCLA’s Mistakes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1405 (1997); Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., The Role of 
State “Little Superfunds” in Allocation and Indemnity Actions Under the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 5 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 83 (1994); James R. Deason, 
Note, Clear as Mud: The Function of the National Contingency Plan Consistency Requirement in 
a CERCLA Private Cost-Recovery Action, 28 GA. L. REV. 555 (1994); Daniel R. Avery, Enforcing 
Environmental Indemnification Against a Settling Party Under CERCLA, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 
872 (1993); Andrew W. Reitze, Jr., Andrew J. Harrison, Jr., & Monica J. Palko, Cost Recovery by 
Private Parties Under CERCLA: Planning a Response Action for Maximum Recovery, 27 TULSA 
L.J. 365 (1992); Alfred R. Light, Antidote or Asymptote to Contribution: Non-Contractual Indem-
nity Under CERCLA, 21 ENVTL. L. 321 (1991); Denise Rodosevich, The Expansive Reach of 
CERCLA Liability: Potential Liability of Executors of Wills and Inter Vivos and Testamentary 
Transfers, 55 ALB. L. REV. 143 (1991); J.B. Ruhl, The Plight of the Passive Past Owner: Defining 
the Limits of Superfund Liability, 45 S.W. L.J. 1129 (1991); Debra L. Baker & Theodore G. 
Baroody, What Price Innocence? A Realistic View of the Innocent Landowner Defense Under 
CERCLA, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 115 (1990); John C. Buckley, Reducing the Environmental Impact of 
CERCLA, 41 S.C. L. REV. 765 (1990); David C. Clarke, Note, Successor Liability Under CERCLA: 
A Federal Common Law Approach, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1300 (1990); Monica Conyngham, 
Comment, Robbing the Corporate Grave: CERCLA Liability, Rule 17(b), and Post-Dissolution Ca-
pacity to be Sued, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 855 (1990); Diane H. Nowak, Comment, CERCLA’s 
Innocent Landowner Defense: The Rising Standard of Environmental Due Diligence for Real Estate 
Transactions, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 827 (1990); Steven Ferrey, The Toxic Time Bomb: Municipal Lia-
bility for the Cleanup of Hazardous Waste, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197 (1988) & David E. Feder, 
The Undefined Parameters of Lessee Liability Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA): A Trap for the Unwary Lender, 19 ENVTL. L. 257 
(1988). 
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (2017). 
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cause environmental pollution or contamination.”73  As the Court of Appeals 
of Kentucky in the RSJ case remarked, the utilization of terms from environ-
mental statutes in the pollution exclusion “reflects the exclusion’s historical 
objective – avoidance of liability from environmental catastrophes related to 
intentional industrial pollution.”74 
A number of other courts, including the Supreme Court of Ohio,75 Mis-
souri Court of Appeals,76 Court of Appeals of Louisiana,77 Supreme Court of 
New York,78 United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,79 and 
United States District Court for the District of Arizona80 have cited the ob-
servation that the pollution exclusion has been traditionally associated with 
environmental pollution in holding that the pollution exclusion does not ap-
ply to bar coverage for injuries involving carbon monoxide. 
B. A REASONABLE POLICYHOLDER WOULD NOT EXPECT INJURIES 
DUE TO CARBON MONOXIDE TO BE EXCLUDED BY THE 
POLLUTION EXCLUSION 
Some courts also cite to the reasonable expectations of the insured in 
favor of coverage in carbon monoxide cases.  The reasonable expectations 
doctrine in insurance law has been adopted in some form by a number of 
states.81  As an example of one court that has adopted the reasonable expec-
tations doctrine, in Public Service Co. of Colorado v. Wallis and Co.’s, the 
Supreme Court of Colorado stated that “if the various provisions conflict with 
each other, then we must construe the contract in a manner that protects the 
reasonable expectations of the insured at the time the insured purchased the 
policies.”82 
In citing the reasonable expectations doctrine in cases involving the pol-
lution exclusion and carbon monoxide exposure, courts have focused on the 
 
73. See W. All. Ins. Co. v. Gill, 686 N.E.2d 997, 999 (Mass. 1997). 
74. See Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 926 S.W.2d at 681. 
75. See Andersen v. Highland House Co., 757 N.E.2d 329, 332-33 (Ohio 2001). 
76. See Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Wyatt, 400 S.W.2d 417, 420-23 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
77. See Thompson v. Temple, 580 So.2d 1133, 1134-35 (La. Ct. App. 1991). 
78. See Kenyon v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford (DPIC Cos.), 626 N.Y.S.2d 347, 350-51 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1993). 
79. See Stoney Run Co. v. Prudential – LMI Commercial Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 34, 47 (2d Cir. 
1995). 
80. See Saba v. Accidental Fire & Cas. Co. of North Carolina, No. CV-14-0037-PHX-GMS, 
2014 WL 7176776, at *4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 16, 2014). 
81. See RANDY MANILOFF & JEFFREY STEMPEL, GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE 
COVERAGE: KEY ISSUES IN EVERY STATE 753 (3d ed. 2015). 
82. See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colorado v. Wallis and Co.’s, 986 P.2d 924, 939 (Colo. 1999). 
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idea that a reasonable insurance policyholder would not characterize carbon 
monoxide emissions that result from a malfunctioning device to be “pollu-
tion.”  In Regional Bank of Colorado, N.A. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine In-
surance Co., the United States Court of Appeals focused its analysis on the 
terms “irritant” and “contaminant” that are contained in the pollution exclu-
sion.83  In holding that the reasonable expectations doctrine precluded the 
application of the pollution exclusion to carbon monoxide injuries, the Court 
in the Regional Bank of Colorado case remarked “a reasonable policyholder 
would not understand the policy to exclude coverage for anything that irri-
tates.”84  On the contrary, the Court stated a more reasonable reading of the 
provision is that “a policyholder would understand the exclusion as being 
limited to irritants and contaminants commonly thought of as pollution and 
not as applying to every possible irritant or contaminant imaginable.”85 
Courts have also cited the fact that an insurance contract is a contract of 
adhesion86 in support of applying the doctrine of reasonable expectations in 
cases involving the pollution exclusion and carbon monoxide exposure.  In 
American National Property & Casualty Co. v. Wyatt, the Missouri Court of 
Appeals specifically stated that, coupled with ambiguous policy language, 
“the fact that the policy was a contract of adhesion makes applicable the doc-
trine of reasonable expectations.”87  
The reasonable expectations doctrine has also been cited by the Supreme 
Court of Nevada,88 Supreme Court of Massachusetts,89 and the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit90 in finding that a pollution exclusion 
is unenforceable in cases involving carbon monoxide injuries. 
 
83. See Reg’l Bank of Colorado, N.A. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 35 F.3d 494, 498 
(10th Cir. 1994). 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. See James M. Fischer, Why are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpre-
tation?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 1008 (1992). 
87. See Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Wyatt, 400 S.W.2d 417, 426 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
88. See Century Sur. Co. v. Casino W., Inc., 329 P.3d 614, 618 (Nev. 2014) (“In light of the 
exclusion’s ambiguity, we must interpret the provision to effectuate Casino West’s reasonable ex-
pectations.”). 
89. See W. All. Ins. Co. v. Gill, 686 N.E.2d 997, 1000 (Mass. 1997) (“An objectively reason-
able insured, reading the language of the typical pollution exclusion, would not expect a disclaimer 
of coverage for these types of mishaps even though they involve ‘discharges,’ ‘dispersals,’ ‘re-
leases,’ and ‘escapes’ of ‘contaminants’ and ‘irritants.’”). 
90. See Stoney Run Co. v. Prudential - LMI Commercial Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 
1995) (“A reasonable policyholder might not characterize the escape of carbon monoxide from a 
faulty residential heating and ventilation system as environmental pollution.”). 
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C. THE LACK OF A LIMITING PRINCIPLE ON THE POLLUTION 
EXCLUSION WOULD LEAD TO ABSURD RESULTS 
Courts have also reasoned that the lack of a limiting principle on the 
pollution exclusion would lead to absurd results.  As the pollution exclusion 
has specifically listed “irritants” or “contaminants” as pollution, the Supreme 
Court of Nevada in the Casino West case noted that an overly expansive read-
ing of the pollution exclusion could include household items such as soap, 
shampoo, and bleach.91  The Court in Casino West observed that if soap and 
bleach were defined as “pollutants,” then the pollution exclusion would apply 
to bar coverage for personal injuries such as “a person slipping on a puddle 
of bleach or developing a skin rash from using a bar of soap.”92  Such results, 
the Court noted, would be “absurd.”93 
The Court of Appeals in the RSJ case specifically adopted the reasoning 
of the Maryland Court of Appeals in Sullins v. Allstate Insurance Co.94 in 
holding the pollution exclusion inapplicable to a case involving carbon mon-
oxide poisoning.95  The Sullins Court cited the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit in Pipefitters Welfare Educational Fund v. 
Westchester Fire Insurance Co., which stated the following: 
 
The terms ‘irritant’ and ‘contaminant,’ when viewed in isolation, 
are virtually boundless, for “there is virtually no substance or chem-
ical in existence that would not irritate or damage some person or 
property . . . Without some limiting principle, the pollution exclu-
sion clause would extend far beyond its intended scope, and lead to 
some absurd results. To take but two simple examples, reading the 
clause broadly would bar coverage for bodily injuries suffered by 
one who slips and falls on the spilled contents of a bottle of Drano, 
and for bodily injured caused by an allergic reaction to chlorine in 
a public pool. Although Drano and chlorine are both irritants or con-
taminants that cause, under certain conditions, bodily injury or prop-
erty damage, one would not ordinarily characterize these events as 
pollution.96 
 
91. See Century Sur. Co., 329 P.3d at 617. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Sullins v. Allstate Insurance Co., 667 A.2d 617 (Md. Ct. App. 1996). 
95. See Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. RSJ, Inc., 926 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996). 
96. Sullins, 667 A.2d at 621 (citing Pipefitters Welfare Ed. Fund v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 
976 F.2d 1037, 1043 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
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The presence of a limiting principle on the text of the pollution exclusion 
strongly supports a finding that the pollution exclusion does not apply to 
cases involving injuries due to carbon monoxide poisoning. 
D. EXAMINING THE INSURANCE CONTRACT AS A WHOLE DOES NOT 
SUPPORT THE APPLICATION OF THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION 
Courts also have cited the purpose of the insurance contract as a whole 
and the insurer - insured relationship in declining to enforce the pollution 
exclusion in cases not involving environmental or industrial pollution.  The 
underlying facts of the Gill case in the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in-
volved a patron who incurred injuries from carbon monoxide due to fumes 
which emanated from an oven in the insured’s restaurant.97  In holding that 
the pollution exclusion did not apply, the Gill Court observed that at the time 
it purchased its commercial general liability insurance policy the insured 
would have contemplated injuries to patrons as a result of employee negli-
gence or equipment malfunctioning would be covered by insurance.98  In a 
case involving an insured that was an architectural and engineering firm, the 
Supreme Court of New York in Kenyon v. Security Insurance Co. of Hartford 
(DPIC Companies) remarked the insured did not routinely generate hazard-
ous substances as part of the business and would have purchased a profes-
sional liability policy to insure claims arising out of professional pursuits.99  
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Gamble Farm Inn, Inc. v. Selective 
Insurance Co. described the responsibility of an insurer to its insured in cases 
involving carbon monoxide injuries in very strong terms by stating an insurer 
 
97. See W. All. Ins. Co. v. Gill, 686 N.E.2d 997, 998 (Mass. 1997). 
98. Id. at 1000, where it was found: 
The insureds obviously did not contemplate that their ordinary cooking operations 
would poison patrons while they were enjoying traditional Indian foods and dinners. 
Surely, when they purchased their policy from Western Alliance, they expected that 
accidents causing injuries to patrons at the restaurant due to the negligence of employees 
or the malfunctioning of ovens and other equipment-claims arising during the course of 
normal business activities would be covered. 
99. See Kenyon v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford (DPIC Cos.), 626 N.Y.S.2d 347, 351 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1993) stating:  
The defendant . . . was in the business of engineering and architecture . . . he did not 
generate or produce hazardous substances routinely in the course of his profession, nor 
did he dispose of toxic waste as a part of his business. He purchased a sweeping profes-
sional liability policy to protect himself from claims of damage resulting from the pur-
suit of his profession. Under the broad coverage he purchased, he reasonably expected 
coverage under the policy. D.P.I.C., as his insurer, certainly knew the nature of his busi-
ness and, if they desired to do so, could have drafted unambiguous endorsements to 
eliminate coverage for the negligent design of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning 
systems. 
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cannot hide “behind the language of its pollution exclusion, to eliminate its 
responsibility to its insured for the type of loss suffered by appellee.”100 
E. AMBIGUITIES WITH THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION SUPPORT A 
READING OF IT IN FAVOR OF COVERAGE 
Finally, several courts have also cited the rule of insurance law that any 
ambiguities in an insurance contract should be resolved in favor of the in-
sured.101  Multiple interpretations of the pollution exclusion exist.  As the 
Supreme Court of Nevada stated in the Casino West case, “the absolute pol-
lution exclusion permits multiple reasonable interpretations of coverage.”102  
In addition, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in the RSJ case emphasized 
that the pollution exclusion generated conflicting judicial interpretations 
throughout the country.103  The RSJ Court noted the fact other judges have 
declined to enforce the pollution exclusion “certainly lends some credence to 
the proposition that the language is ambiguous and must be resolved against 
the drafter.”104  The Supreme Court of Ohio also commented on the split in 
judicial opinions and stated other opinions “provide persuasive support for 
the underlying notion that this particular policy language is ambiguous and 
therefore should be interpreted in favor of the insured.”105 
IV. PROPOSAL – STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
With the courts reaching varying decisions throughout the country on 
the question of whether a pollution exclusion in an insurance policy is en-
forceable to bar coverage for cases of carbon monoxide poisoning, future 
courts which may encounter this issue are left with a lack of consistency 
across jurisdictions.  It is clear that over two decades worth of litigation on 
this issue has not led to a decisive trend either way.  As a matter of public 
policy, to protect victims of carbon monoxide exposure, states should specif-
ically amend their state insurance codes to specifically provide for coverage 
in insurance policies in cases of carbon monoxide exposure. 
 
 
100. See Gamble Farm Inn, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co., 656 A.2d 142, 147 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). 
101. See Washington Nat’l Ins. Corp. v. Ruderman, 117 So.3d 943, 950 (Fla. 2013) (“Where 
the provisions of an insurance policy are at issue, any ambiguity which remains after reading each 
policy as a whole and endeavoring to give every provision its full meaning and operative effect must 
be liberally construed in favor of coverage and strictly against the insurer.”). 
102. Century Sur. Co. v. Casino W., Inc., 329 P.3d 614, 617 (Nev. 2014). 
103. See Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. RSJ, Inc., 926 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996). 
104. Id. 
105. Andersen v. Highland House Co., 757 N.E.2d 329, 334 (Ohio 2001). 
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A. STATE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS REQUIRING CARBON 
MONOXIDE DETECTORS 
The risk and dangers posed by carbon monoxide poisoning have led 
many state legislatures to require the installation of carbon monoxide detec-
tors in a number of buildings.  According to the National Conference of State 
Legislatures, approximately twenty-seven states have specific state statutes 
which require carbon monoxide detectors in private dwellings, and another 
eleven states have regulations requiring carbon monoxide detectors through 
state building codes.106  Several states, including Florida,107 require detectors 
to be installed in newly constructed dwellings.108  Surprisingly, only fifteen 
states have statutes or administrative regulations which require carbon mon-
oxide detectors for hotels and motels.109 
There is momentum for the implementation of strengthened laws which 
require the installation of carbon monoxide detectors.  In 2017, the Minnesota 
Legislature passed a law requiring carbon monoxide detectors on some 
 
106. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Carbon Monoxide Detector Requirements, 
Laws and Regulations (Apr. 3, 2017), http://www ncsl.org/research/environment-and-natural-re-
sources/carbon-monoxide-detectors-state-statutes.aspx (hereinafter “National Conference of State 
Legislatures”). 
107. See FLA. STAT. § 509.211(4). The statute states the following: 
(4) Every enclosed space or room that contains a boiler regulated under chapter 554 
which is fired by the direct application of energy from the combustion of fuels and that 
is located in any portion of a public lodging establishment that also contains sleeping 
rooms shall be equipped with one or more carbon monoxide detector devices that are 
listed as complying with the American National Standards Institute/Underwriters La-
boratories, Inc., “Standard for Gas and Vapor Detectors and Sensors,” ANSI/UL 2075, 
by a nationally recognized testing laboratory accredited by the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration, unless it is determined that carbon monoxide hazards have oth-
erwise been adequately mitigated as determined by the local fire official or his or her 
designee. Such devices shall be integrated with the public lodging establishment’s fire 
detection system. Any such installation shall be made in accordance with rules adopted 
by the Division of State Fire Marshal. In lieu of connecting the carbon monoxide detec-
tor device to the fire detection system as described in this subsection, the device may be 
connected to a control unit that is listed as complying with the Underwriters Laborato-
ries, Inc., “Standard for General-Purpose Signaling Devices and Systems,” UL 2017, or 
a combination system that is listed as complying with the National Fire Protection As-
sociation “Standard for the Installation of Carbon Monoxide (CO) Detection and Warn-
ing Equipment,” NFPA 720. The control unit or combination system must be connected 
to the boiler safety circuit in such a manner that the boiler is prevented from operating 
when carbon monoxide is detected until it is reset manually. 
108. See National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 106. 
109. Id. 
 
            
2018] THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION 239 
 
boats.110  The law, known as “Sophia’s Law,” was enacted largely in response 
to the 2015 death of a seven-year-old girl on a boat due to carbon monoxide 
poisoning from a hole in a boat’s exhaust pipe.111  The law requires any boat 
with designated sleeping accommodations, a galley area with a sink, or a head 
compartment to be equipped with a carbon monoxide detector.112  Sophia’s 
Law takes effect in Minnesota on May 1, 2018.113 
B. PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION – CARBON MONOXIDE 
POISONING PREVENTION ACT 
Since the 110th Congress in 2008, during almost every successive Con-
gress Democratic Senator Amy Klobuchar of Minnesota has introduced the 
Carbon Monoxide Poisoning Prevention Act.114  First introduced in 2008, the 
Carbon Monoxide Poisoning Prevention Act would require all manufacturers 
and distributors to meet the American National Standards Institute (ANSI)115 
standard for single and multiple station carbon monoxide alarms.116  In addi-
tion, the legislation would require all new portable generators sold include an 
interlock safety device that would shut off the generator if carbon monoxide 
levels reached a level that “would cause serious bodily injury or death to peo-
ple.”117  As a public policy matter, the legislation stated that “Congress 
should promote the purchase and installation of carbon monoxide alarms in 
 
110. See Kelly Smith, New Minnesota rule requiring carbon monoxide detectors on boats 




112. See MINN. STAT. § 86B.005 (2016). 
113. See Sophia’s Law – Carbon Monoxide Law for Boaters, MINNESOTA DEP’T OF NAT. 
RESOURCES (2018), http://www.dnr.state mn.us/safety/boatwater/sophias-law html.   
114. See S. 3660, 110th Cong. (2008). 
115. See About ANSI, ANSI (2017), https://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/overview/over-
view?menuid=1stating:   
As the voice of the U.S. standards and conformity assessment system, the American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI) empowers its members and constituents to 
strengthen the U.S. marketplace position in the global economy while helping to assure 
the safety and health of consumer and the protection of the environment. The Institute 
oversees the creation, promulgation and use of thousands of norms and guidelines that 
directly impact businesses in nearly every sector: from acoustical devices to construc-
tion equipment, from dairy and livestock production to energy distribution, and many 
more. ANSI is also actively engaged in accreditation – assessing the competence of 
organizations determining conformance to standards. 
116. See S. 3660, 110th Cong. (2008) at § 3. 
117. Id. at § 4. 
 
            
240 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:2 
 
residential homes and dwelling units nationwide in order to promote the 
health and public safety of citizens throughout the Nation.”118 
The legislation has not yet been enacted into law, despite being intro-
duced in the United States Senate during the 111th Congress (2009-2010),119 
112th Congress (2011-2012),120 113th Congress (2013-2014),121 and 114th 
Congress (2015-2016).122 Companion legislation has been introduced in the 
United States House of Representatives during the 111th Congress (2009-
2010),123 112th Congress (2011-2012),124 113th Congress (2013-2014),125 
and 114th Congress (2015-2016).126  In the 114th Congress, five Democratic 
Senators co-sponsored the legislation (Senators Charles Schumer, Robert Ca-
sey Jr., Al Franken, Richard Blumenthal, and Robert Menendez).127  The ver-
sion of the legislation in the United States House of Representatives received 
bipartisan support from co-sponsors in the 114th Congress, including co-
sponsorship by thirteen Democrats and four Republicans.128 
C. PROPOSAL – MANDATING INSURANCE COVERAGE IN INSURANCE 
POLICIES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES CAUSED BY CARBON 
MONOXIDE 
With numerous states which have laws that require installation of carbon 
monoxide detectors in private dwellings and the presence of some support 
for more stringent standards at the federal level regarding carbon monoxide 
detectors, there is a strong public policy to prevent the dangers of carbon 
monoxide exposure.  In cases where courts have upheld the validity of the 
 
118. Id. at § 2. 
119. See S. 1216, 111th Cong. (2009). 
120. See S. 3343, 112th Cong. (2012). 
121. See S. 1793, 113th Cong. (2013). 
122. See S. 1250, 114th Cong. (2015). 
123. See H.R. 1796, 111th Cong. (2009). 
124. See H.R. 4326, 112th Cong. (2012). 
125. See H.R. 4864, 113th Cong. (2014). 
126. See H.R. 4701, 114th Cong. (2016). 
127. See S. 1250, 114th Cong. (2015). 
128. See H.R. 4701, 114th Cong. (2016). The bill was sponsored by Democratic Congress-
woman Ann Kuster of New Hampshire. The thirteen Democrats who co-sponsored the bill are as 
follows: G.K. Butterfield of North Carolina, Eleanor Holmes Norton of the District of Columbia, 
Brenda Lawrence of Michigan, Donna Edwards of Maryland, James McGovern of Massachusetts, 
Paul Tonko of New York, Chaka Fattah of Pennsylvania, Steve Israel of New York, Katheen Rice 
of New York, Collin Peterson of Minnesota, Debbie Dingell of Michigan, Mark DeSaulnier of Cal-
ifornia, and Raul Grijalva of Arizona. The four Republicans who co-sponsored the bill were Leonard 
Lance of New Jersey, Erik Paulsen of Minnesota, Gregg Harper of Mississippi, and Chris Collins 
of New York. 
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pollution exclusion clause in liability insurance policies in cases involving 
carbon monoxide poisoning, the lack of insurance coverage for an insured 
may very well lead to a situation where the judgment creditor is possibly left 
to try to collect a judgment against an insolvent defendant.  In such a case, 
the victim of carbon monoxide exposure may be left uncompensated for their 
injuries. 
The judicial uncertainty of the application of the pollution exclusion in 
liability insurance policies to cases involving carbon monoxide exposure can 
be resolved by state legislative action.  Since the implementation of the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, the regulation of insurance has traditionally 
occurred at the state level.129  It is not atypical for states to mandate that in-
surance coverage be provided in a number of situations.  For example, many 
states require that automobile liability insurance policies provide an equal 
amount of uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage to the insured and in 
such cases an insured must usually expressly reject the uninsured/underin-
sured motorists coverage.130  In the state of Florida, homeowner’s insurance 
policies must provide coverage for damage from “catastrophic ground cover 
collapse”131 and homeowner’s policies must offer sinkhole coverage as an 
additional option.132  With the requirements for insurance coverage in other 
areas of insurance, it would not be unusual for a state to enact a law making 
a pollution exclusion or any other exclusion inapplicable in cases of personal 
injuries arising from carbon monoxide exposure. 
 
129. See Angela D. Krupar, Note, The McCarran-Ferguson Act’s Intersection with Foreign 
Insurance Companies, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 883, 889 (2010) (“The enactment of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act in response to South-Eastern, coupled with the Act’s stated purpose, the legislative 
history, and case law, establish that Congress intended for the states to regulate the industry of 
insurance.”). 
130. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 627.727(1) (2017); IOWA CODE § 516A.1 (2017). 
131. See FLA. STAT. § 627.706(1)(a) (2017). The statute defines a “catastrophic ground cover 
collapse” in section (2)(a) as  
geological activity that results in all the following: The abrupt collapse of the ground 
cover; A depression in the ground cover clearly visible to the naked eye; Structural 
damage to the covered building, including the foundation, and The insured structure 
being condemned and ordered to be vacated by the governmental agency authorized by 
law to issue such an order for that structure.  
132. See FLA. STAT. § 676.706(1)(b) (2017). The statute states the following: 
The insurer shall make available, for an appropriate additional premium, coverage for 
sinkhole losses on any structure, including the contents of personal property contained 
therein, to the extent provided in the form to which the coverage attaches. The insurer 
may require an inspection of the property before issuance of sinkhole loss coverage. A 
policy for residential property insurance may include a deductible amount applicable to 
sinkhole losses equal to 1 percent, 2 percent, 5 percent, or 10 percent of the policy 
dwelling limits, with appropriate premium discounts offered with each deductible 
amount. 
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States can amend their respective state insurance code in the following 
manner to fully resolve issues of insurance coverage for carbon monoxide 
exposure and to mandate such coverage be available for personal injuries: 
 
It is a public policy of the state of _____ to prevent the risk of carbon 
monoxide and to protect victims of carbon monoxide poisoning. In 
every policy of liability insurance sold in this state, a pollution ex-
clusion or any other type of exclusion in the policy of liability in-
surance shall be inapplicable to bar insurance coverage for any per-
sonal injuries arising as a result of carbon monoxide exposure.133 
 
The adoption of a statutory provision would provide clarity to the issue 
of application of the pollution exclusion in cases involving carbon monoxide 
exposure and would serve to protect victims of carbon monoxide exposure. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is an encouraging overall movement that states are taking more 
action to address the risk of carbon monoxide exposure.  The enactment of 
laws such as the law in Minnesota discussed earlier which require carbon 
monoxide detectors on certain boats are intended to help protect individuals 
from the dangerous risk of carbon monoxide poisoning.134  In the wake of a 
morass of judicial decisions on the enforceability of the pollution exclusion 
in insurance policies to cases involving carbon monoxide poisoning, the leg-
islative branches of state legislatures throughout the country can provide 
clear guidance on this issue.  Specifically, state legislatures can amend state 
insurance codes to mandate insurance policies provide coverage for personal 
injuries involving carbon monoxide exposure and protect victims of carbon 
monoxide who in some situations may be left uncompensated for their losses. 
 
133. The author of this Article offers this language as an example of how states can amend 
their state insurance codes.  
134. See Kelly Smith, Minnesota law requiring carbon monoxide detectors on boats wins na-
tional recognition, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE (Nov. 2, 2017), http://www.startribune.com/min-
nesota-s-new-law-requiring-carbon-monoxide-detectors-on-boats-the-first-in-the-nation-wins-na-
tional-recognition/454759933/.  
